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NOTE
LESNICK V. HOLLINGSWORTH & VOSE CO.-THE PURE
STREAM OF COMMERCE NO LONGER FLOWS THROUGH
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in a forum state has
been problematic in our federal system for quite some time.'
Today, in order to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant, the nonresident must have minimum contacts
with the forum state.2 While the test may be stated succinctly,
determining whether a person or corporation has minimum
contacts with the forum state is an extremely complex process,
as seen in the line of personal jurisdiction cases following Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.'
The concept of "stream of commerce" arose within the frame-
work of personal jurisdiction in the early 1960's.4 Stated sim-
ply, the stream of commerce theory allows a forum state to
assert jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer when that
manufacturer releases an injury-producing product into the
stream of commerce and the product causes injury in the forum
state.5 The courts have applied the stream of commerce theory
in a wide variety of cases.6 However, determining whether min-
1. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. See infra part IL
4. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761
(Ill. 1961).
5. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11 (2d ed. 1993).
6. See, e.g., Hahn v. Vermont Law School, 698 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1983) (breach of
contract); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhi Wine Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647
F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (trademark infringement); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech-
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imum contacts exist in the area of products liability, where
many different manufacturers combine their individual products
to make a single product, is particularly problematic.'
Part of the confusion in the area of component parts manu-
facturer liability is a result of the United States Supreme
Court's failure to issue a definitive statement on the subject. In
two earlier cases, the Court seemed to approve of the stream of
commerce theory and advocate its use.' However, in 1987 the
Supreme Court split 4-4-1 on the issue of personal jurisdiction
over component parts manufacturers in Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court.9 This fragmented holding has contribut-
ed to confusion and disparity in lower court decisions, ° which
is the focus of this note.
The Fourth Circuit recently decided Lesnick v. Hollingsworth
& Vose Co.," a products liability case involving the stream of
commerce theory. In Lesnick, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
a manufacturer's knowledge that his product would be sold in
the forum state was not sufficient to establish the necessary
minimum contacts with the forum. 2 In this decision, the
Fourth Circuit expressly adopted the view of minimum contacts
advocated by Justice O'Connor in Asahi.
This note suggests that the Lesnick court ruled incorrectly by
adopting O'Connor's approach, which requires more than the
manufacturer's knowledge that the product will be sold in the
forum state. Part II gives a historical review of personal juris-
diction and the development of the stream of commerce theory.
The competing views of the stream of commerce theory which
emerged from the decision in Asahi are explained in depth.
Next, Part III documents the Fourth Circuit decisions leading
nology Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977) (breach of contract and fraud); Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961) (products
liability).
7. See infra parts II, III & IV. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987); Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 277 (3d Cir. 1994); Lesnick v.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
8. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
9. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
10. See infra parts III & IV.
11. 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
12. Id. at 946-47.
422 [Vol. 29:421
LESNICK V. HOLLINGSWORTH & VOSE Co.
up to Lesnick and discusses the background, outcome, and ap-
plication of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lesnick. Part IV ex-
plains how other circuits have decided the stream of commerce
issue. An analysis of the future of the stream of commerce
theory and a prediction of how the current Supreme Court
would stand on the theory follows in Part V. Finally, Part VI
concludes that the Supreme Court should adopt Justice
Brennan's more liberal view of the stream of commerce theory
which subjects the defendant to the forum court's jurisdiction if
the defendant knew or should have known the product would
go to the forum state.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Personal Jurisdiction Prior to Asahi
1. The Supreme Court Speaks on Personal Jurisdiction
The advent of the modern approach to personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants came in 1945 with International
Shoe Co. v. Washington."3  Rejecting the legal fiction of
"presence" and focusing directly on the due process aspect of
asserting personal jurisdiction, 4 the International Shoe Court
stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defen-
dant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present with-
in the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."5
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Prior to this case, the accepted method of establishing
jurisdiction was dictated by Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). For a thorough
discussion of Pennoyer, see FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.3. The Pennoyer
Court created a strict rule requiring physical presence by holding that a state could
adjudicate a dispute involving a nonresident only if the nonresident could be person-
ally served in the state or had property in the state that could be attached.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.
14. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.10.
15. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
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The basic principles of International Shoe were construed and
expanded in subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court;16 and
in 1980, the Court explicitly adopted a two-pronged minimum
contacts test in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.'
The first prong of the minimum contacts test requires the
court to evaluate whether the defendant has engaged in conduct
directed toward the forum state."5 In other words, the defen-
dant must "purposefully avail" himself of the privileges of con-
ducting business in the forum. 9 In a series of cases since
Hanson v. Denckla," which added the "purposeful availment"
requirement to the first prong of the minimum contacts test,
the Court has further refined the "purposeful availment" theo-
ry.2 One commentator has opined that this line of cases illus-
16. See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.11; William M. Richman,
Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 (1993).
17. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
As has long been settled, . . . a state court may exercise personal juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist 'mini-
mum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State.... The
concept of minimum contacts . . . perform[s] two related, but distinguish-
able functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
States . . . do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them . . . as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
Id. at 291-92.
18. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 316). The minimum contacts branch of the test was expanded to include "purpose-
ful availment" specifically in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985), the Court further explained that
" lurisdiction is proper . .. where the contacts proximately result from actions by the
defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State."
19. Hanson, 357 U.S at 253.
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State. . . . [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws (footnote omitted).
Id.
20. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
21. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (finding that a
defendant who established a contractual relationship with the plaintiff in the forum
state purposefully availed himself of the forum state's laws); Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that defendant whose product was distributed by a third
party had the necessary contacts with the forum); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (finding that defendant had not purposefully availed
himself of the forum solely through the plaintiffs unilateral act of bringing the prod-
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trates that "purposeful availment" should be defined as "a pat-
tern of behavior by a defendant that can objectively be expected
to result in contacts between the defendant and the state in
question."
22
Asserting personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
who has established minimum contacts with the forum state
satisfies due process since the privilege of conducting business
in the forum carries with it an obligation to respond to a suit
in that state.23 If a court finds that the nonresident defendant
has not "purposefully availed" himself of the benefits of doing
business in the forum state, the court need not balance the
inconveniences of the parties.' However, if the defendant has
directed his actions toward the forum, the court then moves to
the second prong of the minimum contacts test.
The second prong of the minimum contacts test requires the
court to inquire whether hearing the case in the forum state
would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."25 The International Shoe Court noted that this prong
would be satisfied as long as the defendant corporation had
sufficient contacts with the forum state "as make it reasonable
to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there."26 The inquiry under this prong includes a bal-
ancing of the following factors: the burden on the defendant;
the interests of the forum state; the plaintiffs interest in ob-
taining relief; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtain-
ing the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the inter-
est of the states in furthering their social policies.27
uct into the forum state); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (holding that a
father who allowed his child to spend time in California with the mother had not
purposefully availed himself of California law).
22. Kim Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. LITIG.
239, 255 (1988). This definition is helpful in deciphering the vague concept of pur-
poseful availment.
23. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 297 ("[Tlhe foreseeability that is critical . . .is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.").
24. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.11.
25. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
26. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
27. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
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The Supreme Court proceeded to shape and refine the nebu-
lous principles set forth in International Shoe in the years fol-
lowing the decision. The International Shoe Court pronounced
four principles to assist the lower courts in evaluating the mini-
mum contacts prong of the test.2 These principles have
evolved into the concepts of general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction.29
One of the principles enunciated in International Shoe ac-
knowledges that when a defendant has significant, continuous
activities in the forum state, he may be haled into court there
even if the cause of action is unrelated to his activities in the
state.30 This principle is the basis of the concept of general
jurisdiction.31 General jurisdiction requires substantial forum-
related activity on the part of the defendant in order for a court
to assert jurisdiction over the defendant.32 If a defendant regu-
larly conducts business in the forum state, the court may assert
jurisdiction over him even though the cause of action does not
arise from the defendant's forum activities.33
If a defendant does not have enough contacts with the forum
state to support general jurisdiction, the court then looks to
specific jurisdiction. "It has been said that when a State exer-
cises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out
of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the
State is exercising 'specific jurisdiction' over the defendant."'
28. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18.
29. The Supreme Court first formally recognized the distinction between general
and specific jurisdiction in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408 (1984); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). For a more detailed
discussion of general and specific jurisdiction, see Lea Brilnayer, Related Contacts &
Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1444 (1988) and Mary Twitchell, The Myth
of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988).
30. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min-
ing Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
31. For a more detailed discussion of general jurisdiction, see Brilmayer, supra
note 29; Lea Brilnayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80-81; Twitchell, supra note 29; Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1136-44 (1966).
32. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.10.
33. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
34. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
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The concept of specific jurisdiction arises from three principles
articulated in International Shoe.
The first principle announced that jurisdiction is permissible
when the defendant has continuous and systematic activity in
the forum state and the cause of action is related to that activi-
ty.35 The second principle holds that even if the defendant con-
ducts only sporadic activity or a single act within the forum, if.
the cause of action arises from that contact, then the forum
may assert jurisdiction over the defendant.36 Finally, if the
defendant's sporadic or casual activity in the forum state does
not give rise to the cause of action, the forum may not assert
jurisdiction over the defendant.37
The defendant's activities in the forum state must conform
with one of the principles discussed above in order for the court
to assert specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Over the
years, the courts have, developed means of interpreting these
principles." One such interpretation is known as the "stream
of commerce" theory, which arose in response to the question of
whether a defendant manufacturer has purposefully availed
itself of the forum state under the first prong of the minimum
contacts test.
2. The Stream of Commerce Recognized and Applied
The stream of commerce theory arose as part of the mini-
mum contacts analysis in the early 1960s."9 The theory states
that a company can be held accountable for injuries caused by
its product in any state where the product is sold through the
stream of commerce.4" The genesis of the stream of commerce
theory lies in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.,41 a products liability case arising in Illinois. The defen-
35. International Shoe, 326 U.S. 320; see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5,
§ 3.10.
36. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.11.
37. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.11; Dayton, supra note 22.
38. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.11.
39. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761(Ill. 1961).
40. Id. at 766.
41. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939
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dant was an Ohio-based component parts manufacturer of wa-
ter heater valves.42 The only contact between the Ohio manu-
facturer and Illinois was the sale, by a third party, of a water
heater containing the defective valve in Illinois.4 The Illinois
court held that assertion of jurisdiction over the Ohio-based
defendant was permissible under what is now known as the
stream of commerce theory." After the Gray decision, many
courts began to use the stream of commerce theory, applying it
to final manufacturers and component parts manufacturers.45
The United States Supreme Court endorsed the stream of
commerce theory in dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson.46 World-Wide Volkswagen involved a products liabili-
ty action resulting from a car accident in Oklahoma.47 Citing
Gray with approval, the Court stated that a forum state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over "a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
(4th Cir. 1994), discussed in part III.B, infra, is factually similar to Gray.
42. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762. For a thorough discussion of Gray, see Dayton,
supra note 22, at 262-67; Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of
Commerce Theory: A Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 255-60
(1989).
43. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
44. Id. at 766. The court stated:
Where the alleged liability arises . . . from the manufacture of products
presumably sold in contemplation of use here, it should not matter that
the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone
other than the defendant shipped the product into this State .... [I]f a
corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it
is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damages caused by
defects in those products.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale
of final product); Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1969) (sale of final product from foreign manufacturer); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian,
414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969) (sale of final product); International Harvester Co. v.
Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 459 S.W.2d 62 (Ark. 1970) (sale of component parts); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57 (Cal. 1969) (sale of final product); Connelly
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. 1979) (sale of tire from foreign manufacturer),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980); Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
415 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1966) (sale of component parts); Winston Indus., Inc. v. Dist.
Court, 560 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1977) (sale of final product).
46. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.11.
47. 444 U.S. at 288. The plaintiffs brought suit against a group of defendants
including the New York automobile retailer from whom they had purchased the car
and a regional distributor for the New York-Connecticut-New Jersey region. Id.
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State."48 However, under the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen
the Court found that the defendants did not purposefully avail
themselves of Oklahoma's jurisdiction because the plaintiff, not
the defendant distributors, had unilaterally introduced the prod-
uct into Oklahoma.49
After World-Wide Volkswagen, several federal circuit courts
adopted the view that placing a product into the stream of
commerce with the defendant's mere awareness that his prod-
uct may reach the forum state is enough to invoke personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The District of Columbia Circuit
adopted this interpretation of the stream of commerce theory in
a patent infringement suit.5" The Second Circuit implicitly ap-
proved the Gray stream of commerce analysis in a products
liability action.5 The Third Circuit adopted the stream of com-
merce theory in a products liability case" and in an admiralty
claim.53 The Fifth Circuit, which had adopted the stream of
commerce theory before World-Wide Volkswagen,54 reaffirmed
48. Id. at 297-98. The Court stated that 'foreseeability' alone has never been a
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." Id. at
295. Nevertheless, the Court explained that foreseeability was a valid consideration:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.
Id. at 297.
49. Id. at 297-98.
50. See Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party, Ltd.,
647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See infra part V.A for a further discussion of
Stabilisierungsfonds.
51. See Montalbano v. Easco Hand Tools, Inc., 766 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1985). A
New York plaintiff was injured while using a wood-splitting maul manufactured by a
Japanese company and distributed in the United States through a Pennsylvania dis-
tributor. In considering whether the Pennsylvania distributor would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the New York court, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for further fact-finding regarding the distributor's contacts with New York.
Id. at 743. However, the Second Circuit cited Gray with approval and hinted that the
Pennsylvania distributor might be amenable to suit in New York. Id.
52. See Hendrickson v. Reg 0 Co., 657 F.2d 9, 15 (3d Cir. 1981). The defendant,
an Illinois valve manufacturer, was sued in the Virgin Islands when the plaintiff was
injured in an explosion allegedly caused by a defective propane tank valve. Id.
53. See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). "[A] manufacturer may be held amenable to process in a
forum in which its products are sold, even if the products were sold indirectly
through importers or distributors with independent sales and marketing schemes." Id.
at 285.
54. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving a defective
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its adherence to the theory in a products liability action.55 The
Sixth,56  Seventh,57  Ninth," and Tenth59  Circuits also
adopted the stream of commerce theory in products liability
cases.
The First Circuit tacitly rejected the stream of commerce
theory in Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co.6" The court
held that the sale of two helicopters to Puerto Rico could not
constitute placing the goods into a "stream of commerce" and
was too sporadic to justify subjecting the manufacturer to juris-
cigarette lighter); Sells v. International Harvester Co., 513 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1975)
(involving a defective truck fan blade); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591
(5th Cir. 1969) (involving a plaintiff injured on an amusement ride).
55. See Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (5th
Cir. 1984). A Washington state component parts manufacturer of steel castings sold
its castings to a California company. The California company then turned the castings
into cylinders which served as parts of a dredge constructed in Louisiana. Id. at
1082. The Washington manufacturer was sued in Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit held
that, under the stream of commerce theory, the manufacturer was subject to suit
there. Id. at 1085-86.
56. See Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1982). A Michi-
gan retailer purchased "long-nose" pliers from a Japanese trading company that had
purchased the pliers from an unrelated Korean manufacturer. The pla.intiffs brother
purchased the pliers from the retailer in Ohio and the plaintiff was injured in Ohio
when the pliers broke. Id. at 1152. The Sixth Circuit held that Ohio had jurisdiction
over the Japanese trading company because it had "at least indirectly sought to serve
the market for its products in Ohio." Id. at 1155; see also Poyner v. Erma Werke
GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Insurance Co. of
North America v. Poyner, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (involving a defective semi-automatic
pistol manufactured in Germany).
57. See Nelson ex rel. Carson v. Park Indus., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984). A Hong Kong manufacturer of flannel shirts
was sued by a Wisconsin minor plaintiff because the shirt ignited after coming into
contact with a cigarette lighter. Id. at 1122.
58. See Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1983) (in-
volving a defective wire-rope splice used to secure a ship's boom); Plant Food Co-op v.
Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155, 158-60 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving prop-
erty damage after the wrong fertilizer was distributed).
59. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440, 446-
47 (10th Cir. 1985). The insurer of a geophysical exploration company sued a Penn-
sylvania manufacturer of synthetic fiber cables in Utah for injuries sustained when
the cable broke. The cable was purchased by an Arkansas helicopter pilot via mail
order. The pilot then brought the cables to Utah to move the exploration company's
equipment. Id. at 441-42.
60. 781 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1986). A Puerto Rican plaintiff sued a California
manufacturer of helicopters for injuries sustained when the helicopter crashed. The
helicopter was purchased by the Puerto Rico Police Department through a third party
Florida company. Id. at 10-12.
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diction."' However, the First Circuit added that the "test is not
knowledge of the ultimate destination [of defendant's product],
but whether the manufacturer has purposefully engaged in
forum activities so it can reasonably expect to be haled into
court [in the forum]. " 62
The Eighth Circuit also seemingly rejected the stream of
commerce theory in Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc.63 The court ac-
knowledged the impact of Gray and its progeny, but pointed out
that the defendant in Hutson had not intentionally solicited
business in the forum or exercised any control over the decision
of the distributor to send the product there.' Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit refused to assert jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.65
Although the expansive stream of commerce approach was
widely embraced after World-Wide Volkswagen, the clarity of
the theory did not endure. In its next opinion involving the
stream of commerce, the Supreme Court muddied the waters.
B. The Asahi Split on Stream of Commerce
In 1987, the Supreme Court issued its most recent statement
on the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.66 In Asahi, the
-plaintiffs motorcycle tire exploded, resulting in an accident that
severely injured the plaintiff and killed his wife.67 The plaintiff
brought a products liability action in the California Superior
Court against the tire manufacturer, Cheng Shin Rubber Indus-
trial Company ("Cheng Shin"), and the manufacturer of the tire
valve assembly, Asahi Metal Industry Company ("Asahi"). In
addition, Cheng Shin filed an indemnity cross-claim against
Asahi. The plaintiff then settled his claim against Cheng Shin,
61. Id. at 15.
62. Id.
63. 584 F.2d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). In Hutson,
a product sold by an Italian company reached Arkansas and caused a personal injury.
Id. at 837; see also Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984).
64. Hutson, 584 F.2d at 837.
65. Id.
66. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
67. Id. at 106.
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leaving only the indemnity cross-claim between Asahi and
Cheng Shin in the California court.6" Asahi moved to quash
Cheng Shin's service of summons on the ground that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be violated
if California asserted jurisdiction because Asahi did not have
the requisite minimum contacts with California.69 The Su-
preme Court of California held that Asahi had sufficient con-
tacts with California to assert jurisdiction under the purposeful
availment requirement of World-Wide Volkswagen.7"
The United States Supreme Court considered the question
and applied the two-prong minimum contacts test articulated in
World-Wide Volkswagen.7 The Court was nearly unanimous on
the second prong of the test. Eight of the nine justices joining
in Part II.B. of the opinion agreed that allowing California to
assert jurisdiction over Asahi in the indemnity action would
violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."72
While the Supreme Court agreed that it would be unfair for
Asahi to be haled into court in California," the Court was
sharply divided on the issue of whether Asahi had established
minimum contacts with California under the first prong of the
minimum contacts test.74 Due to a split of opinion on the
stream of commerce theory, there was no majority opinion on
this issue. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice
68. Id.
69. Id. The trial court denied Asahi's motion to dismiss. The California Court of
Appeals then ordered the trial court to quash service due to lack of jurisdiction. Id.
70. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 551 (Cal. 1987). The
court stated that the requirement of purposeful availment has been met when a com-
ponent parts manufacturer intentionally sells its products to another manufacturer
knowing that the parts will be incorporated into the finished product and sold in the
forum state. Id.
71. See supra notes 17-19 & 25-27 and accompanying text.
72. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). Justice
Scalia did not join in Part II.B. Id. at 104.
73. The Court applied the five-part balance of conveniences test laid out in
World-Wide Volkswagen and concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
the California court would be unreasonable and unfair. The burden on Asahi to liti-
gate in California outweighed the minimal interest of Cheng Shin in having the case
decided in California and the slight interests of the state in the outcome of the case.
Id. at 114-16. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
five-part balance of conveniences test.
74. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
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Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia in arguing that no
minimum contacts existed.75 Justice Brennan, joined by Justic-
es White, Marshall and Blackmun, argued that minimum con-
tacts were established through the stream of commerce theo-
ry.76 Justice Stevens stood alone in arguing that the Court
should not even consider the issue because the case had already
been decided on the fairness prong of the minimum contacts
test." Each of these views is discussed in turn below.
1. The O'Connor Plurality
Justice O'Connor clearly rejected the idea that placing goods
in the stream of commerce with knowledge that they will make
their way to the forum state is enough to establish minimum
contacts." Relying on the "purposeful availment" and "substan-
tial connection" language in Hanson v. Dencklav9 and Burger
King v. Rudzewicz, ° Justice O'Connor argued that additional
conduct on the part of the defendant is necessary to indicate an
intent to "serve the market in the forum state."8'
The plurality opinion fashioned by Justice O'Connor has been
criticized soundly by many commentators.82 Professor Howard
75. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108.
76. Id. at 116.
77. Id. at 121.
78. Id. at 112.
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more,
is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.... But a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce
may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the
mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully
directed toward the forum State.
Id.
79. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
80. 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
81. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. O'Connor suggests several actions that would show
the requisite intent by the defendant, such as: 1) designing the product for the mar-
ket in the forum state; 2) advertising in the forum state; 3) establishing channels for
providing regular advice to customers in the forum state; or 4) marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Dayton, supra note 22; Gregory Gelfand, A Dissenting View of Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 873 (1988); Erik T. Moe,
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Bare-
ly Alive but Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203 (1987); Murphy, supra note 42; Howard
1995]
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Stravitz points out that Justice O'Connor never even mentioned
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,83 even
though it had been cited by the Supreme Court with approval
in two prior cases." Prior to the Asahi decision, the expansive
stream of commerce theory had been embraced by the federal
courts as a sound theory.85 However, as one commentator aptly
remarks, "[i]f O'Connor's view is accepted, the [stream of com-
merce] doctrine is dead, awaiting only burial. That such a view
could garner even one justice's support, let alone four, suggests
a complete lack of common ground between the objectives gov-
erning their analysis, and those previously thought to be uni-
versally accepted." 6
O'Connor's opinion has also been criticized for ignoring eco-
nomic reality.7 Under her view, even manufacturers of the
final product could arguably escape liability by employing mid-
dlemen and not controlling their market selection.' Even
though Asahi had no office or agents in California, it had a
healthy business in California and made substantial profits
from sales in California. 9
2. The Brennan Plurality
Justice Brennan disagreed strongly with Justice O'Connor's
interpretation of the stream of commerce theory. Brennan's
view has been referred to as the better reasoned view of the
Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
39 S.C. L. Rev. 729 (1988).
83. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
84. Stravitz, supra note 82, at 791. The Court had cited Gray with approval in
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
85. See, e.g., Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.
1984); Carson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983); Hedrick v. Daiko
Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983); Hendrickson v. Reg 0 Co., 657 F.2d 9 (3d
Cir. 1981); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party Ltd.,
647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
86. Gelfand, supra note 82, at 882.
87. Gelfand, supra note 82, at 883-84, 884-85 n.46.
88. Gelfand, supra note 82, at 884-85 n.46.
89. Gelfand, supra note 82, at 884.
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two plurality opinions" and has been supported by several
commentators. 9'
Under the first prong of the minimum contacts test, Brennan
concluded that Asahi had established minimum contacts with
California; however, Brennan felt it would be unfair to hale the
company into a California court under the second prong of the
test.92 Brennan contended that a showing of additional conduct
directed toward the forum state was not needed in order to
establish minimum contacts. His argument is cogent:
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable cur-
rents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As
long as a participant in this process is aware that the final
product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibili-
ty of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will
the litigation present a burden for which there is no corre-
sponding benefit. A defendant who has placed goods in the
stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail
sale of the final product in the forum State, and indirectly
benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate
commercial activity.93
Justice Brennan also argued that the Court should adhere to
its dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen, which specifically distin-
guished between foreseeability that a defendant's own actions
and connections will bring his product to the forum state and
the foreseeability that a third party will bring the defendant's
product to the forum state.94 The Court in World-Wide Volks-
90. Stravitz, supra note 82, at 793.
91. See, e.g., Dayton, supra note 22; Gelfand, supra note 82; Moe, supra note 82;
Murphy, supra note 32; Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine: Up the Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105
(1991); Stravitz, supra note 82.
92. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116. Justice Brennan said, "[t]his is one of those rare
cases in which 'minimum requirements inherent in the concept of "fair play and sub-
stantial justice" . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defen-
dant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.'" Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985)).
93. Id. at 117.
94. Id. at 119.
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wagen stated that only in the former situation should the de-
fendant anticipate being haled into court in the forum State."
3. Justice Stevens' Opinion
Since the Court had already decided that asserting jurisdic-
tion over Asahi would be unreasonable and unfair, Justice
Stevens found it unnecessary for the Court to articulate any
new test regarding the necessary conduct of a defendant toward
the forum to establish minimum contacts. 6 However, Stevens
stated that if a test were required, the O'Connor plurality mis-
applied its new test to the facts of the case. 7 Justice Stevens
failed to see the distinction that Justice O'Connor attempted to
draw, stating: "[t]he [O'Connor] plurality seems to assume that
an unwavering line can be drawn between 'mere awareness'
that a component will find its way into the forum State and
'purposeful availment' of the forum's market.""
Stevens proposed that some sort of quantitative determina-
tion be made concerning the defendant's contacts, including the
volume, value, and hazardous character of the components, to
determine purposeful availment.99 He concluded that, under
the specific facts of this case, Asahi's contacts with California
involved more than merely placing its product into the stream
of commerce and would constitute purposeful availment of the
forum.'00  Justice Stevens' conclusion seems to support
Brennan's view of the stream of commerce theory. By not join-
ing in Justice Brennan's opinion, Stevens' concurrence left the
door open for the Court to endorse Brennan's view at some
point in the future without having to overrule Asahi explicitly.
The state of the stream of commerce theory after Asahi is
unclear. The validity of "mere awareness" was undermined by
95. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
96. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121. "This finding alone requires reversal .... Accordingly,
I see no reason in this case for the plurality to articulate 'purposeful direction' or any
other test as the nexus between an act of a defendant and the forum State that is
necessary to establish minimum contacts." Id. at 122.
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the decision even though five of the nine justices endorsed it.
Today, some federal circuit courts of appeals continue to em-
brace the expansive stream of commerce view advocated by
Justice Brennan while others, like the Fourth Circuit, are mov-
ing toward a more restrictive view similar to that of Justice
O'Connor.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY IN
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
The Asahi decision provided little help to the lower courts
struggling with the question of whether knowledge that a prod-
uct is going to the forum state is enough to establish minimum
contacts with the forum state. Circuit courts are forced to
choose between the two views of the stream of commerce theory
or find other ways to circumvent the question.'' The evolving
trend in the Fourth Circuit has been disjointed. The district
courts within the Fourth Circuit had favored Brennan's
view,' °2 while the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had leaned
toward the O'Connor view.' 3 In 1994, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit specifically adopted the O'Connor view in
Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co."4
A. The Fourth Circuit and the Stream of Commerce Before
Lesnick
Shortly after the Supreme Court rendered the Asahi decision,
the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
considered the stream of commerce theory in Hall v.
101. See infra part IV.
102. See Stokes v. L. Geismar, S.A., 815 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Va. 1993); Hall v.
Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
103. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989); see also
Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1993). In
Ellicott Machine, the Fourth Circuit did not explicitly choose between the two views
of the stream of commerce theory. However, the court did find that "[mlinimum con-
tacts exist where the defendant 'purposefully direct[sl' its activities toward the resi-
dents of the forum." Id at 477 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 472 (1985)).
104. 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994). For a detailed discussion of Lesnick, see infra
part III.B.
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Zambelli. °5 The district court asserted jurisdiction over a Jap-
anese fireworks manufacturer under the stream of commerce
theory since the court found that the Asahi decision had not
expressly destroyed the theory.
10 6
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the
holding of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 7 in Fed-
eral Insurance Co. v. Lake Shore Inc."°5 by reiterating that the
stream of commerce theory could not be applied when the uni-
lateral action of a third party brings the manufacturer's product
into the forum state.109 Even though it was foreseeable that
the ship manufactured by the defendants would dock in South
Carolina, the court held that the defendants had not estab-
lished any purposeful contacts with South Carolina and there-
fore could not be subjected to South Carolina's jurisdiction." °
105. 669 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. W. Va. 1987). The plaintiff was hit in the eye by a
fireworks shell that exploded prematurely. He sued the Japanese manufacturer who
sold the fireworks to the Pennsylvania vendor that employed the plaintiff in West
Virginia. Id. at 753.
106. Id. at 756.
The splintered writings of the justices in Asahi arguably leave in doubt
the continued viability of the stream-of-commerce theory. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court's endorsement of the theory in World-Wide Volkswag-
en taken together with the lack of consensus in Asahi convinces this
Court that the theory continues to have precedential value.
Id.
107. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
108. 886 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989). In Federal Insurance, General Electric shipped a
turbine accessory base on a ship built in Wisconsin by one of the defendants. The
ship was docked in South Carolina, and the accessory base was being loaded when
the winch, designed by another defendant, malfunctioned causing damage to the ac-
cessory base. Id. at 656-57. Federal Insurance Company had to pay General Electric
for the damaged accessory base. Federal Insurance Company then sued the builder of
the ship and the manufacturer of the winch in the District Court of South Carolina.
Id. at 657.
109. Id. at 660.
All products are mobile to some extent and a product-by-product ap-
proach to personal jurisdiction would succeed only in drawing courts into
an arcane and litigious search for meaningless distinctions. Predictability
in structuring business dealings would be impaired and personal jurisdic-
tion would rest on random and arbitrary categorizations. The relevant
inquiry is the nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum.
Id.
110. Id. at 658.
[Aippellant may not rely on an unadorned "stream of commerce" theory
to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants.
Appellant's alleged injuries did not arise out of defendants' direct or
indirect commercial activities in the South Carolina market for cargo
438
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In Federal Insurance Co., the Fourth Circuit refused to decide
between the two stream of cominerce views since the question
was not properly before the court."'
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia consid-
ered the stream of commerce theory in Stokes v. L. Geismar,
S.A."' In Stokes, the manufacturer of an injury-causing saw
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the corporation
lacked minimum contacts with Virginia because its product only
arrived in Virginia via a United States distributor."' The
court held that the manufacturer's knowledge that its product
was going to be sold in Virginia was sufficient to justify assert-
ing jurisdiction over the foreign corporation."'
The above cases did not address the question of which
stream of commerce theory should apply in the Fourth Circuit.
Justice O'Connor's view in Asahi had been cited with possible
approval by the court of appeals in Lake Shore, Inc."5 while
the district courts seemed to follow Justice Brennan's more
expansive view of the stream of commerce theory."6 There-
fore, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found itself obliged to
winches or ocean going vessels, and Lake Shore and Peterson did not
create, control, employ, or benefit from a distribution system which
brought the vessel to South Carolina.
Id. at 659.
111. Id. at 659-60.
We need not, of course, reject a "stream of commerce" theory in all cir-
cumstances in order to decide this case. Such a course would be problem-
atic because the issue is one that has closely divided the Supreme Court.
We do hold, however, that a "stream of commerce" theory of personal
jurisdiction has no applicability here.
Id. at 659.
112. 815 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Va. 1993). This case involved a worker who was in-
jured while operating a rail cutting saw. Plaintiff brought suit against the manufac-
turer and distributor of the saw. The manufacturer was a French corporation and the
distributor was a United States subsidiary, wholly owned by the French corporation.
Id. at 905-06.
113. Id. at 906.
114. Id.
The fact that a foreign parent, like Geismar, conducts its marketing and
distribution in the United States through an independent distribution
system does not shield it from in personam jurisdiction. Due process is
satisfied as long as the foreign manufacturer knew and intended that its
product would be sold in Virginia.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 105-06 & 112-14 and accompanying text.
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affirmatively define which version of the stream of commerce
theory would apply in the Fourth Circuit. Lesnick v.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co."' presented the appellate court
with a perfect opportunity to do so.
B. The Fourth Circuit Takes a Stand in Lesnick v.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co.
1. Background History of the Lesnick Case
Lesnick is the first published opinion directly involving the
stream of commerce and component parts manufacturers issued
by the Fourth Circuit following the Asahi decision."' The
plaintiff, Beverly Lesnick, brought a wrongful death action in
the District Court of Maryland alleging that the filters in Kent
brand cigarettes caused her husband's death."' Mr. Lesnick
was diagnosed in May 1989 with mesothelioma (a form of lung
cancer) caused not by the inhalation of tobacco smoke, but by
the inhalation of crocidolite asbestos, a substance incorporated
into the filters of Kent cigarettes.20 On November 21, 1989,
Mr. Lesnick died. 2' Mrs. Lesnick's December 1991 diversity
action named as defendants Lorillard, Incorporated, the manu-
facturer of Kent cigarettes and Hollingsworth & Vose Company,
the manufacturer of the filters.
12
Lorillard, Incorporated is a New York corporation with its
principal place of business in New York. 23 There was no
question that the Maryland court had jurisdiction over Lorillard
117. 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
118. See supra part II.B. for a summary of the Asahi decision. The Fourth Circuit
recently handed down an unpublished opinion in which they implicitly adopted the
O'Connor opinion of the stream of commerce theory. Jarre v. Druckmaschinen, A.G.,
No. 93-1848, 19 F.3d 1430, 1994 WL 95944, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 25, 1994) (unpub-
lished opinion) ("[Tihe mere placement of products into the stream of commerce by a
nonresident defendant is not an act purposefully directed at the forum state.").
119. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 940. Mrs. Lesnick based her claims on Maryland theories
of negligence, strict liability, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, and breach of express warranty. Id.
120. Id. The filter was known as the "Micronite Filter" and was incorporated into





LESNICK V. HOLLINGSWORTH & VOSE CO.
because it was responsible for marketing and distributing the
cigarettes nationwide. Hollingsworth & Vose Company is a
Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business
in Massachusetts." Hollingsworth & Vose made the filters in
Massachusetts and shipped them to Lorillard's manufacturing
plants in Kentucky and New Jersey where they were incorpo-
rated into the cigarettes." The only connection Hollingsworth
& Vose had with the state of Maryland was the fact that
Hollingsworth & Vose knew the cigarettes would be sold in
Maryland when it sold the material for the filters to
Lorillard.2 '
2. The Parties Choose Between the Two Views
The Maryland long-arm statute gives the state jurisdiction
over certain nonresidents. 17  However, Hollingworth & Vose
argued that under the reasoning of Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion in Asahi,28 jurisdiction could not be asserted over an
out-of-state component parts manufacturer who simply placed
its goods in the stream of commerce with the knowledge that
the goods would eventually be sold in Maryland.19
Mrs. Lesnick first argued that the language of Worldwide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson should control.' Worldwide
124. Id.
125. Id. Between 1952 and 1956, Hollingsworth & Vose supplied approximately ten
billion filters containing asbestos to Lorillard. Id.
126. Id.
127. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (1994). The statute provides in
part:
b) In general.-A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person, who directly or by an agent:
1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or
service in the State;
2) Contracts to supply goods, good, services, or manufactured prod-
ucts in the State;
3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the
State;
4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an
act or omission outside the State if he . . . engages in any other persis-
tent course of conduct in the State. ...
Id.
128. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
129. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 940.
130. Id. at 941.
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Volkswagen only requires that the defendant put a product "in-
to the stream of commerce with the expectation that [it] will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State" to establish mini-
mum contacts.'31 Secondly, Mrs. Lesnick argued that even if
the court applied the heightened standard posited by Justice
O'Connor in Asahi, jurisdiction over Hollingsworth & Vose
would still be appropriate because they were more than a mere
component parts manufacturer. She characterized the relation-
ship between Hollingsworth & Vose and Lorillard as a "Virtual
partnership" as the two companies worked together to "develop
a filter for general distribution through integration into
Lorillard's cigarettes."" 2
3. The District Court Rejects the Stream of Commerce Theory
Hollingsworth & Vose filed a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. '33 The district court granted
the motion in an unpublished opinion, stating "Hollingsworth &
Vose Company is not engaged directly, as is Lorillard, in bring-
ing the alleged offending product into Maryland, or doing any-
thing with respect to Maryland, other than supplying its prod-
uct to defendant Lorillard in a state other than Maryland.""
The trial court then entered final judgment in favor of
Hollingsworth & Vose.'
35
4. The Fourth Circuit Adopts and Refines the O'Connor View
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit' 3 began its
opinion by recapping the history of personal jurisdiction."'
131. Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
132. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 941. See infra note 156 for details of the agreement be-
tween Lorillard and Hollingsworth & Vose.
133. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 941; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
134. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 941.
135. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
136. The case was heard by a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit which in-
cluded Circuit Judges Murnaghan and Niemeyer and Judge Hilton, United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation. The decision
in Lesnick was unanimous and the opinion was written by Judge Niemeyer. Lesnick,
35 F.3d at 939-40.
137. Id. at 941-45.
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The court concluded that the minimum contacts test138 should
be applied along with the limitations articulated in Hanson v.
Denckla39 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 40 in all sit-
uations involving out-of-state defendants.' The court then
considered World-Wide Volkswagen,' which contains lan-
guage specifically relating to the stream of commerce. Al-
though several other circuit courts of appeals have interpreted
the World-Wide Volkswagen language as saying that delivery
into the stream of commerce with knowledge the product will
arive in the forum state is enough to establish personal juris-
diction, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the language differently."' The court reasoned that the reli-
ance in World-Wide Volkswagen upon the fact that the defen-
dants did not direct their activities toward Oklahoma, and
therefore could not be expected to be haled into court there,
meant that the language regarding the stream of commerce
found in World-Wide Volkswagen should be interpreted narrow-
ly. " 5 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the holding in World-
Wide Volkswagen requires some type of purposeful activity by
138. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
139. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that to assert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, there must be "some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus in-
voking the benefits and protection of its laws.").
140. 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) ("Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts prox-
imately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial
connection' with the forum state.").
141. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 942. The court explained:
These modem principles of personal jurisdiction do not, and indeed under
the Constitution could not, reorder the separate sovereignties of the
states. A state's jurisdictional power remains territorial, to be exercised
within its boundaries over persons, property and activities there. Rather,
these principles focus on the nature and quality of contacts with the
state to determine whether they justify the state's exercise of its judicial
power over the person.
Id. at 943.
142. Id. at 943-44. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the World-Wide Volkswagen case.
143. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. The Supreme Court stated:
"The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it as-
serts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
in the forum State." Id.
144. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 943-44.
145. Id. at 944.
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the defendant toward the forum state in order to establish
meaningful contacts with the state.46
Next, the court considered Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Supe-
rior Court.47 After summarizing the three separate opinions
regarding stream of commerce,'48 the Fourth Circuit held that
"[to permit a state to assert jurisdiction over any person in the
country whose product is sold in the state simply because a
person must expect that to happen destroys the notion of indi-
vidual sovereignties inherent in our system of federalism."'49
The court felt that a rule like the one endorsed by Justice
Brennan in Asahi would make it impossible for defendants to
plan their business risks.15
The court then articulated a two-prong test (adopting the
approach to minimum contacts advanced by Justice O'Connor)
to be applied in the Fourth Circuit when considering the reach
of personal jurisdiction. The court stated:
[T]he test to be applied . . . inquires whether (1) the defen-
dant has created a substantial connection to the forum
state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state
or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the
laws of the state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction based
on those minimum contacts would not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice, taking into
account such factors as (a) the burden on the defendant, (b)
the interests of the forum state, (c) the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining relief, (d) the efficient resolution of controversies
as between states, and (e) the shared interests of the sever-
al states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.151
After enunciating its test, the court of appeals proceeded to
apply it to the facts of the Lesnick case. The court found that
Hollingsworth & Vose had no presence in Maryland.'52
Hollingsworth & Vose admitted placing its filters into the
146. Id.
147. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See supra part II.B for a detailed discussion of Asahi.
148. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 944-45. See supra part II.B.
149. Id. at 945.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 945-46.
152. Id. at 946.
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stream of commerce knowing that the Kent brand cigarettes
would be sold by Lorillard in Maryland.'53 Less than one per-
cent of Hollingsworth & Vose's income was derived through
Lorillard's sale of cigarettes in Maryland."u The court held
that these contacts, without more, were not sufficient for Mary-
land to establish jurisdiction over Hollingsworth & Vose'
Mrs. Lesnick argued that because Hollingsworth & Vose had
such a close connection with Lorillard, it should be subject to
jurisdiction through Lorillard's contacts to Maryland.'56 The
court acknowledged that the relationship between Hollingsworth
& Vose and Lorillard represented "additional conduct" beyond
merely placing the filters into the stream of commerce; howev-
er, the court found that this additional conduct did not rise to
the level of establishing jurisdiction because Hollingsworth &
Vose's conduct was not specifically directed toward Mary-
land."' 7 Therefore, the District Court of Maryland could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over Hollingsworth & Vose, and
the lower court's decision was affirmed.'58
C. Application of the Lesnick Test
The District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
recently applied the Lesnick test in Bashaw v. Belz Hotel Man-
agement Co."9 Bashaw was injured while attending a seminar
at a resort and conference center in Florida owned by the de-
fendants. The plaintiff sued in West Virginia asserting jurisdic-
tion based on advertisements by the defendants in national
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 946-47.
156. Id. at 946. Lorillard and Hollingsworth & Vose had entered into a contract in
1952 in which the two companies agreed to own jointly the patent to the "Micronite
Filter" and to share information about technical advances in the field. In addition,
the two shared equally the costs of developing the filter, the costs of the manufactur-
ing facilities, and royalties that might be earned from licensing their process.
Hollingsworth & Vose agreed to sell the filter only to Lorillard for at least the
first five years of their dealings. Lorillard had also agreed to indemnify Hollingsworth
& Vose for any liability arising from harmful effects of the product. Id.
157. Id. at 946-47.
158. Id. at 947.
159. 872 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
1995] 445
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
trade magazines, operation of a toll-free telephone line, and the
stream of commerce theory. 60
The defendants moved to dismiss the suit based on a lack of
personal jurisdiction, and the court applied the two-prong
Lesnick test. Under the first prong of the test, there must be
some substantial connection between the defendant and the
forum state as established by actions purposefully directed
toward the forum. 6' In Bashaw, the court held that the de-
fendants lacked sufficient contacts with West Virginia because
their actions were not purposefully directed toward West
Virginia. 6' Once the case failed the first prong of the Lesnick
test, the court declined to apply the second prong of the
test. 163
IV. DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER ASAHI
After the Supreme Court decided Asahi, the circuit courts
began the arduous task of interpreting the decision and apply-
ing it to specific cases. Three circuits have expressly adopted
Justice Brennan's view" and a fourth has hinted that it may
approve the stream of commerce theory posited by Brennan.'65
Before Lesnick, only one circuit court had adopted the "addition-
al conduct" theory advanced by Justice O'Connor.'66
160. Id. at 324-25.
161. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 945-46.
162. The only contact the defendants had with West Virginia was a phone call
from the plaintiff in West Virginia confirming the plaintiffs reservation. Bashaw, 872
F. Supp. at 324-25.
163. Id. at 327. The second prong of the Lesnick test addresses whether the exer-
cise of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 946.
In an interesting resolution to the problem, the district court did not dismiss
the case due to lack of jurisdiction. Instead, the court granted the defendants' alter-
native motion to transfer venue to the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. Bashaw, 872 F. Supp. at 328.
164. See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613-
15 (8th Cir. 1994); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th
Cir. 1993); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992). These
cases are discussed more thoroughly in part W.A., infra.
165. See North Am. Philips Corp. v. American Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (approving jurisdiction over a defendant who was conscious that his
product would reach the forum state). This case is discussed more thoroughly in part
IV.A., infra.
166. See Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods. Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992). This case
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A. Circuit Courts Adopting Brennan's View
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit heard Dehmlow v. Austin Fire-
works167 and reiterated its support for Brennan's view of the
stream of commerce theory. The Dehmlow case arose in Illinois,
the birthplace of the stream of commerce theory.' The Illi-
nois plaintiff received serious injuries in Illinois when a fire-
work sold by a Kansas manufacturer detonated improperly. 6 9
The Kansas manufacturer sold the fireworks to a Wisconsin
company specializing in fireworks display knowing that the
Wisconsin company intended to take the fireworks to Illinois to
set up a display.70 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the sale of the fireworks with knowledge that
they would be going to Illinois was sufficient for the Illinois
federal district court to assert jurisdiction over the Kansas
manufacturer."
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed
its adherence to Brennan's view of the stream of commerce in
Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co. 2 The Texas
is discussed more thoroughly in part IV.B., infra.
167. 963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992).
168. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). For previous Seventh Circuit cases advocating the stream of commerce theory,
see Mason v. F. LU Luigi & Franco Dal Maschio Fu G.B., 832 F.2d 383, 386-87 (7th
Cir. 1987); Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-
26 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
169. Dehmlow, 963 F.2d at 943.'
170. Id. at 944. The ditrict court dismissed the plaintiffs case for lack of personal
jurisdiction based on World-Wide Volkswagen v: Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Id.
171. Id. at 947. The court stated:
Under the stream of commerce theory Dehmlow's case is resolved on his
behalf by noting that Austin sold fireworks to Bartolotta [the Wisconsin
company] with the knowledge that its fireworks would reach Illinois con-
sumers in the stream of commerce. Because the Supreme Court estab-
lished the stream of commerce theory, and a majority of the Court has
not yet rejected it, we consider that theory to be determinative.
Id. (citations omitted) The court also concluded that, even if Justice O'Connor's view
was applied, the facts of the case would meet the more stringent minimum contacts
standards. Id. at 947-48.
172. 9 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 1993). For other Fifth Circuit opinions rejecting
O'Connor's "stream of commerce plus" theory, see Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4
F.3d 413, 145 (5th Cir. 1993) and Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d
383, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1989).
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plaintiff sued a Delaware manufacturer of gas-turbine engines
systems in federal district court in Texas. The Delaware
manufacturer then filed a third party complaint against a
Minnesota component parts manufacturer for indemnity.' 3
The Minnesota manufacturer moved to dismiss the third party
claim based on lack of personal jurisdiction.' 4 The district
court dismissed the case, adopting Justice O'Connor's view of
personal jurisdiction enunciated in Asahi.' 5 Based on its prior
refusal to accept O'Connor's position, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Texas district court
could assert jurisdiction over the Minnesota component parts
manufacturer.'76
The Eighth Circuit chose to adopt Brennan's Asahi view of
stream of commerce in the 1994 case of Barone v. Rich Brothers
Interstate Display Fireworks Co.' In Barone, the Nebraska
plaintiff received injuries from defective fireworks in Nebras-
173. Ruston, 9 F.3d at 417.
174. Id. The facts indicate that the Minnesota component parts manufacturer
(Corchran, Inc.) agreed in its contract with the Delaware systems manufacturer that
the systems would be purchased by a Texas company. Corchran knew that its parts
would be shipped to Texas; furthermore, Corchran shipped equipment directly from
Minnesota to Texas on 211 separate occasions. Id.
175. Id. at 420. "[Tlhe [district] court concluded that because Donaldson did not
show that Corchran engaged in acts 'purposefully directed toward the forum state,' a
federal district court in Texas could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Corchran."
Id.
176. Id.
[The district court's] reasoning fails to recognize the Fifth Circuit's inter-
pretation of the stream of commerce test and is therefore erroneous ...
[Tihis circuit [has] expressed its position that Asahi does not provide
clear guidance on the 'minimum contacts' prong, and therefore we will
continue to follow the stream of commerce analysis in World-Wide Volks-
wagen. Under the World-Wide Volkswagen test, Corchran's contacts with
Texas are more than enough to justify an exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion. Corchran intentionally placed its products into the stream of com-
merce by delivering them to a shipper destined for delivery in Texas
... . Corchran not only could have foreseen that the products might end
up in Texas, it knew as a fact that the products were going to be deliv-
ered to a specific user in Houston, Texas.
Id. (citations omitted).
177. 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994). Prior to Barone, the Eighth Circuit seemed to
have adopted Justice O'Connor's opinion in Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works,
Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990). Other courts have interpreted Falkirk as adopting
Justice O'Connor's view. See, e.g., Boit v. Bar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683
(1st Cir. 1992). However, in Barone, the Eighth Circuit limited Falkirk to its facts.
Barone, 25 F.3d at 615.
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ka.78 The plaintiff sued the South Dakota distributor and the
Japanese manufacturer of the fireworks in federal district court
in Nebraska."9 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
refused to apply Asahi, stating that "Asahi stands for no more
than that it is unreasonable to adjudicate third-party litigation
between two foreign companies in this country absent consent
by the nonresident defendant."' After deciding that Asahi did
not apply, the court of appeals held that the district court could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese manufactur-
er.181
In North American Philips Corp. v. American Vending Sales,
Inc.,182 a trademark infringement case, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals intimated its approval of Justice Brennan's
stream of commerce theory.'83 The plaintiff and holder of a
patent sued two corporations, one from Texas and one from
California, in Illinois." The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that the two corporations had "voluntarily placed a
substantial quantity of infringing articles into the stream of
commerce conscious that they were destined for Illinois"'85 and
therefore were subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois
court.
186
178. Barone, 25 F.3d at 610-11.
179. Id. The district court granted the Japanese manufacturer's motion to dismiss
and refused to certify the question for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1992). The
plaintiff then dismissed his claim against the South Dakota distributor without preju-
dice in order to have a final judgment to appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Barone, 25 F.3d at 611.
180. Id. at 614. "Should one engage in vote counting, . . . it appears that five jus-
tices [in Asahi] agreed that continuous placement of a significant number of products
into the stream of commerce with knowledge that the product would be distributed
into the forum state represents sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process."
Id.
181. Id. at 615.
182. 35 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
183. Id. at 1579-80.
184. Id. at 1577.
185. Id. at 1580 (emphasis added). The court continued:
Regardless where the transactions are deemed to be situated under the
tort or the "transacting business" provisions, these defendants were none-
theless parties to the importation into the forum state. Surely the rea-
sonable market participant in the modem commercial world has to expect
to be haled into the courts of that state, however distant, to answer for
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B. Circuit Courts Adopting O'Connor's View
Prior to Lesnick, only the First Circuit specifically embraced
Justice O'Connor's approach to personal jurisdiction. 7 In Boit
v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc.,' two Maine plaintiffs sued an Indi-
ana manufacturer of a hot air gun, claiming the gun caused a
fire at their home.'89 The First Circuit, applying Justice
O'Connor's Asahi approach to personal jurisdiction, held that
the defendant's contacts with Maine were insufficient to justify
personal jurisdiction. 9 '
C. Circuit Courts Avoiding the Issue
Immediately after the Supreme Court handed down the Asahi
decision, one commentator predicted that the uncertainties left
in its wake would lead courts to avoid the stream of commerce
issue whenever jurisdiction could be ruled out.'9 ' To a large
degree, this prediction has come true. Many courts have avoided
addressing the stream of commerce question by deciding cases
purely on the basis of the facts on record.192 These courts
have refused to choose between the two views in Asahi by hold-
ing that the outcome of the jurisdictional inquiry is identical
under either view. One other court avoided, or at least delayed,
187. The Eleventh Circuit cited the O'Connor approach in Madara v. Hall, 916
F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1990). However, it is unclear whether the court specifi-
cally endorsed the approach.
188. 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992).
189. Id. at 673. The contractor working on the plaintiffs' home purchased the hot
air gun through a mail-order catalog. Id. at 674.
190. Id. at 683. The court stated, "because 'mere awareness' that a product may
end up in the forum state does not constitute 'purposeful availment,' the district court
could not have constitutionally exercised personal jurisdiction over Gar-Tec." Id.
191. Note, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REv. 119,
266 (1987).
192. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566
(Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 18 (1994); Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical
Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 543-44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993);
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993); Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds,
499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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deciding the stream of commerce issue by remanding the case
to the district court to flesh out additional jurisdictional
facts.' 93
V. THE FUTURE OF THE STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY
The future of the stream of commerce theory is unclear. Be-
cause of the 4-4-1 opinion in Asahi, the lower courts have less
guidance in applying the stream of commerce theory than be-
fore the Asahi decision. As discussed in Part IV of this note,
the various federal courts of appeal are still grappling with the
determination of whether a manufacturer has established mini-
mum contacts with a state by putting a product into the stream
of commerce.
Several commentators have proposed solutions to the mini-
mum contacts problem. One suggests a two-step stream of com-
merce analysis, consistent with Justice Brennan's rationale in
Asahi. 4  Another commentator argues that a manufacturer
should be subject to personal jurisdiction under the stream of
commerce doctrine even absent actual awareness that the prod-
uct was going to the forum state.'95 This view advocates a
very "pure" stream of commerce theory similar to strict liability
in tort; if the defendant's product causes injury to anyone any-
where, then it should be held liable in the forum where the
injury occurred even though the defendant had no knowledge of
the product's destination.
193. Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 33 F.3d 277, 283 (3d Cir. 1994).
194. Moe, supra note 82, at 224. The first step of this proposed analysis requires a
determination of whether the defendant had actual knowledge of forum sales. The
second step provides that if actual knowledge cannot be established, then the court
should examine the defendant's forum contacts to determine whether knowledge of
forum sales should be imputed to the defendant. Id. In essence, this approach looks
to see whether a defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of significant forum
sales which would demonstrate that the defendant has purposefully availed himself of
the laws of the forum state. Id- As required by International Shoe, this proposed test
would be applied to determine whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the
forum state. The inquiry into fairness would still be applied under the second prong
of International Shoe. Id.
195. Gelfand, supra note 82, at 883. "Holding a party liable only if he has knowl-
edge that his product will reach the forum state simply places a premium on igno-
rance." Gelfand, supra note 82, at 886.
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While the suggestions of these conmentators are interesting,
the only practical and likely solution is for the United States
Supreme Court to consider the question again and choose be-
tween the O'Connor view and the Brennan view. The Supreme
Court recently denied certiorari to the Lesnick case.196 This
case would have provided an excellent vehicle for the Court to
make a decision between the two views since it involves a de-
fendant that clearly had knowledge his product was going to
the forum state. Unfortunately, the stream of commerce theory
question remains unresolved.
A. Prediction of the Supreme Court's Decision
If the Supreme Court were to hear a stream of commerce
case, it is difficult to envision how they would decide the issue
today. The composition of the Court has changed drastically
since Asahi was decided in 1987. Five new justices have joined
the Court: Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Of the five justices who have retired since Asahi, four
subscribed to Brennan's view,197 whereas only one agreed with
O'Connor. 9 '
However, three of the five new justices have discussed the
stream of commerce theory in decisions they rendered prior to
joining the Supreme Court.199 While serving as a judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Justice
196. 115 S. Ct. 1103 (1995). See supra Part III.B. for discussion of Lesnick.
197. Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun in his Asahi
opinion. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987).
198. Justice Powell, who joined O'Connor's opinion, retired shortly after the Asahi
decision was announced. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES
1789-1993, 495 (Clare Cushman ed. 1993). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,
who also joined in O'Connor's opinion, are still on the Court.
199. Justice Souter served on the New Hampshire Supreme Court from 1983 until
1990. President Bush appointed Souter to the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990.
Three months later, Justice Brennan announced his retirement and Bush nominated
Souter, to the United States Supreme Court. Souter was confirmed in October 1990.
Id. at 524-25. He did not participate in any decisions involving the stream of com-
merce before joining the Court.
Justice Thomas was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
1990. He was nominated by President Bush in 1991 to replace retiring Justice
Thurgood Marshall. After a great deal of controversy, he was confirmed in late 1991.
Id. at 529. Thomas never participated in a stream of commerce decision prior to
joining the Court.
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Kennedy. authored an opinion in a libel case in which he
discussed the stream of commerce.2' Since the opinion was
written before Asahi, Justice Kennedy simply repeated the
prevalent view of the stream of commerce at that time which
was reasonable foreseeability. °2 He went on to say that in a
libel case, foreseeability that an offending publication would
enter a forum is not consistent with fairness nor is it a fair
measure of the reasonableness of an exercise of juri~diction over
the publisher.0 3 Only if a substantial risk of defamation is
reasonably foreseeable could the defendant be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the forum court.04
Since Justice Kennedy authored the opinion in Church of
Scientology of California v. Adams before Asahi was decided, it
is difficult to predict how he would handle a stream of com-
merce question today. However, applying his reasoning in that
case to a situation like Lesnick, he might well hold that a de-
fendant could be haled into court wherever his product could
reasonably be expected to cause injury.
200. Justice Kennedy was nominated to the Court by President Reagan after the
Senate rejected Judge Bork in 1988. Kennedy replaced the retiring Justice Powell. Id.
at 519.
201. See Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978). This case
pre-dates the Asahi decision. The California Church of Scientology sued a Missouri
publisher of a newspaper in California for defamation arising from an article written
and published in Missouri regarding the Missouri Church of Scientology. Id. at 895.
202. Id. at 897. Justice Kennedy stated:
In products liability cases, this determination resolves into an inquiry as
to whether the defendant could reasonably foresee that his product, when
injected into the stream of commerce, would come to rest in the fo-
rum.... [T]he due process inquiry turns in large part on whether it
was foreseeable that the defective product would be introduced into the
state.
Id. (citations omitted).
203. Id. In Church of Scientology, a very small number of copies of the Missouri
newspaper were circulated in California to approximately 150 regular subscribers of
the newspaper. Justice Kennedy stated, "[w]hile it was reasonably foreseeable that
the allegedly libelous articles would find their way to California, we think it was not
reasonably foreseeable that any substantial risk of defamation would arise from their
circulation in that state...." Id. at 898.
204. Id. 898-99.
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In 1981, Justice Ginsburg °5 authored an opinion regarding
the stream of commerce theory in the context of a trademark
infringement action.26 The court held that jurisdiction could
be exerted over the defendants because they "arranged for in-
troduction of their wine into the United States stream of com-
merce with the expectation (or at least the intention and hope)
that their products [would] be shelved and sold at numerous
local outlets in diverse parts of the country." °7
Ginsburg's opinion in Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser
Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party, Ltd. was also written prior to the
Asahi decision but right after World-Wide Volkswagen. Justice
Ginsburg adhered to the dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen by
holding that a defendant who places its product in the stream
of commerce with the expectation or intention that the product
reach the forum is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
forum state.0 8 If Ginsburg continues to embrace this pre-
Asahi philosophy, her vote would support Brennan's view of
stream of commerce theory.
Justice Breyer,"9 the newest member of the Court, comes to
the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, which has never embraced the stream of commerce the-
ory. In 1988, Breyer wrote the opinion in Benitez-Allende v.
Alcan Aluminio Do Brasil.21° In that case, Breyer interpreted
Asahi to mean that a defendant's knowledge and intent of the
sale of its product in the forum, considered along with the num-
ber of products actually sold in the forum, provide a sufficient
205. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was nominated to the Court by President Clinton in
1993 to replace the retiring Justice White. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIO-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 189 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed. 1994).
206. Stablisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party, Ltd., 647
F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Australian defendants challenged jurisdiction because they
did not directly distribute their wine in the United States. Instead, they shipped the
wine to a New York importer who had exclusive authority to distribute the wine in
the eastern part of the United States. Id. at 203.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Breyer was nominated in May 1994 to replace the retiring Justice Blackmun.
Judge Breyer's Nomination, WASH. POST, May 15, 1994, at C6.
210. 857 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1988). The case involved defective pressure cookers
manufactured by the defendant and arose in Puerto Rico. The defendant argued that
the court did not have jurisdiction because the defendant only sold the cookers to
American distributors who then sold the cookers in Puerto Rico. Id. at 29.
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basis for the assertion of jurisdiction."' The Benitez-Allende
decision is a perfect example of how courts have avoided decid-
ing between the two views in Asahi."2
Breyer's opinion in Benitez-Allende suggests that if he had to
choose among the views expounded in Asahi, he would follow
Justice Stevens. Breyer cited to Brennan's view with seeming
approval and then added Stevens' argument that a significant
number of sales over a period of years constitutes purposeful
availment.21' Almost as an aside, Breyer added that the defen-
dant could be subjected to jurisdiction even under the view of
Justice O'Connor." 4 The holding enunciated by Breyer com-
bines both views, concluding that knowledge plus the number of
products sold is a sufficient basis for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion."5  However, Justice Breyer's cursory treatment of
O'Connor's analysis may indicate his disapproval of her ap-
proach to the stream of commerce.
If the Supreme Court were to hear a products liability case
involving the stream of commerce theory in order to elucidate a
clearer standard, another split of opinion similar to Asahi may
occur. The prior decisions of Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg
are of minimal guidance since the cases pre-dated Asahi. How-
ever, both have applied an expansive view of the stream of
commerce theory in the past."6 One could surmise from Jus-
tice Breyer's former opinion that he might lean toward the
Stevens view. On the other hand, Breyer does come from the
First Circuit Court of Appeals which has expressly adopted
O'Connor's position. Justices Souter and Thomas have not spo-
211. Id. The court found that the defendant in Benitez-Allende met both Asahi
views. The defendant met Brennan's view through its knowledge that its products
would be sold in Puerto Rico. It also met O'Connor's view by hiring an "export advi-
sor" to go to Puerto Rico to meet an American distributor to discuss how the
defendant's cookers could be sold in Puerto Rico. Id. at 29-30.
212. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text. In 1992, the First Circuit
embraced O'Connor's restrictive view of the stream of commerce in Boit v. Gar-Tec
Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992). See supra notes 188-91 and accompany-
ing text.
213. Benetez-Allende, 857 F.2d at 30.
214. Id. "The opinion of the remaining four justices indicates that, once the factor
of the meetings between Schmid and Diaz is taken into account, all nine justices
would find the assertion of jurisdiction constitutional." Id.
215. Id. at 29.
216. See supra notes 203-06 & 208-10.
1995] 455
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ken directly to the issue; however, they tend to vote conserva-
tively and might favor Justice O'Connor's view.217 Nonetheless,
it is the position of this author that, in order to preserve the
stream of commerce theory and notions of fair play, the Su-
preme Court should adopt Justice Brennan's view.
B. Why the Brennan View.Should Be Adopted by the Court
Justice Brennan's opinion is the better reasoned view. A
defendant who knows that his product is going to the forum
state should not be surprised that if the product causes injury
in the state, it will be haled into court there. In the commercial
setting, it is not always possible to determine a manufacturer's
actual knowledge.218 If actual knowledge cannot be deter-
mined, then it may be possible to impute knowledge to the
defendant if his product is regularly sold in the forum state. "9
For component parts manufacturers, knowledge should also
be sufficient to uphold jurisdiction. If not, then a component
parts manufacturer would rarely be held accountable for inju-
ries caused by its product since the manufacturer of the final
product is most often the one responsible for advertising and
distributing the final product in the forum state. A component
parts manufacturer who knows the product is entering the
forum state should not be exempt from liability simply because
it has no additional contacts with the state.22 °
Consideration should be given to the length of the association
between the component parts manufacturer and the distributor
of the products.Y If the association is a long one, then it is
more likely that the component parts manufacturer knows that
its products are going to the forum state.222 If a significant
217. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 427-30 (1994). In due process cases involving a court's jurisdiction
over nonresident litigants and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Justice
Souter has voted liberally 16.7% of the time in the six cases he has considered. Id.
In the three cases Justice Thomas has considered on these issues, he has voted liber-
ally 33.3% of the time. Id.
218. Moe, supra note 82, at 225.
219. Id.
220. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761(111. 1961).
221. Moe, supra note 82, at 226.
222. This argument can also be used to support the O'Connor approach requiring
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amount of products are regularly sold to the final manufactur-
er/distributor by the component parts manufacturer, then the
component parts manufacturer should reasonably anticipate
being sued in a forum in which its product would eventually be
found.223
Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co.224 is a case with facts
favoring personal jurisdiction over the defendants which never-
theless yielded a bad result. If a company places a product into
the stream of commerce knowing where the product is going,
the company should be held accountable in the states where the
product has caused injury. Hollingsworth & Vose knew that
cigarettes containing its filters would be sold in Maryland. In
fact, it sold ten billion filters to Lorillard with the knowledge
that some would be sold in Maryland.225 Selling the filters to
Lorillard knowing that Hollingsworth & Vose would receive
benefit from the sale of the cigarettes in Maryland in and of
itself constitutes purposeful availment. Just as in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz,226 Hollingsworth & Vose sought out and
entered into a contract to supply goods to a company that had
a "substantial connection" with Maryland. In turn, that com-
pany passed Hollingsworth & Vose's product into Maryland.
These actions constitute purposeful availment and the Maryland
court should have been allowed to assert personal jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory
has been considered several times by the United States Su-
preme Court without the emergence of a controlling precedent.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court said in dicta that a state
may assert personal jurisdiction over a corporation that "deliv-
ers its products into the stream of commerce with the expecta-
something more than mere awareness.
223. Moe, supra note 82, at 226. In Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), the Supreme Court intimated that regularity of the con-
tacts when the cause of action arises from the contacts might be an important con-
sideration. Id. at 414-15.
224. 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
225. Id. at 940, 946.
226. 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
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tion that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State."2 7 This seemed to settle the question and most courts
accepted the theory as valid.225
The apparent understanding of stream of commerce after
World-Wide Volkswagen did not last long due to the decision in
Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court.229 The Asahi
case had the potential to provide a cogent test for use in the
lower courts. Instead, it resulted in three distinctly separate
opinions with no majority of the Court supporting any of the
three.21' After Asahi, the federal courts have less guidance
than before on the question of in personam jurisdiction in
stream of commerce cases. The various federal circuit courts of
appeals are more widely divided on the issue today than ever
before.
The time has come for the Supreme Court to resolve the
uncertainty and lack of direction created by Asahi and give
approval to long-arm jurisdiction where a manufacturer knows
or should know that its product will enter the forum state. The
Lesnick case offered an ideal opportunity for the Court to pro-
vide such clarity. However, the Court declined to do so, perhaps
because of the distinct possibility of another split in opinion on
the issue. Therefore, the conflicting interpretations of Asahi be-
tween the circuits remain unresolved. Hopefully, the Court will
soon recognize that the problem is one that must be addressed
in order to clear the waters of the stream of commerce.
Lori Elizabeth Jones
227. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
228. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
229. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
230. See supra part II.B.
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